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ABORTION AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN
by
William J. Prior

The problem of abortion is surely the most important issue in
biomedical ethics today. Both the popular and the philosophical debate
on this question have emphasized the rights of the parties involved,
and the issue has been protrayed as one of "rights in conflict" -the
right of the fetus to life at odds with the rights of the pregnant woman
to privacy, control of her body, and self-determination. This emphasis
on questions of rights has been unfortunate, for two reasons. First, it
has resulted in a polarization of the disputants into two camps, which
has led in turn to an impasse in the debate. 1 Second, it has narrowed
discussion of the moral permissibility of abortion to a single issue,
whereas the question is broader in scope and more complex.
Other factors besides the rights of the parties involved bear on
the moral permissibility of abortion, for there are other forms of oral
evaluation besides those that concern the violation or protection of
some right. We might ask not what rights of individuals are protected
or violated by the practice of abortion in a society, but whether the
practice is beneficial to that society. We might ask, not what rights the
pregnant woman and her fetus have, but what their needs are and how
they can be met. We might discuss the question of the permissibility of
abortion not against the background of a political social or ethical
theory such as libertarianism or contractarianism, where the language
of rights is of central importance, but against the background of other
theories in which ~uch language is not so completely natural.
We might do these things, but need we? In this paper I shall
argue that we do. By examining critically a classic defense of abortion,
that of Judith Jarvis Thomson,2 I shall attempt to show that the
resolution of the conflict of rights, even if successful, does not answer
the question of the moral permissibility of abortion. I shall go on to
argue that, when we place the question of abortion in the context of
Christian ethics, we can, without recourse to the language of rights,
reach a definite answer to the question of the moral permissibility of
abortion, and one which is at odds with Thomson's. I shall make use in
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this argument of the parable of the Good Samaritan, which Thomson,
interestingly enough, makes use of also in her article. I shall argue that
her use of the parable is in fact a misuse of it, that the lesson implicit
in the parable is incompatible with a principle Thomson needs to make
her defense of abortion work. 3
I

Thomson's defense of abortion is interesting in several respects.
First, she concedes (though only for the sake of argument) the humanity
of the fetus, 4 a point on which she differs from most defenders of
abortion. As a consequence of this, she grants to the fetus a right to
life, a claim which opponents of abortion have regarded as decisive
for their case . Unlike them, however, she argues that abortion is permissible in spite of the fetus's right to life. She makes out her case by
means of a justly famous analogy:
let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and
find yourself back to back in bed with an unconcious violinist. A
famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal
kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all
the available medical records and found that you alone have the
right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and
last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours,
so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood
as well as your own ... It's only for nine months. By then he will
have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from
you .. . Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?
No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness.
But do you have to accede to it? '

She argues that you do not; her argument relies on the reader's
sharing her intuition that such a demand would be "outrageous." She
finds the demand outrageous because the violinist has no right to use
your kidneys. 6 She admits that he needs them, but denies that he has a
right to them. She is aware that "in unplugging yourself, you are killing
him"; 1 nonetheless, since he has no right to use your kidneys, "you
surely are not being unjust to him. " 8 Since the right to life "consists
not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed
unjustly, " 9 by unplugging yourself from the violinist you would not
violate his right to life. You would be within your rights to do it; therefore, it is morally permissible for you to unplug yourself (and, mutatis
mutandis, to obtain an abortion under at least some circumstances).
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The argument is only as strong as the analogy, which can be
criticized. 10 I shall accept the soundness of the analogy, however, (as
Thomson does the humanity of the fetus, for the sake of argument)
and the conclusion drawn from it that the violinist has no right to the
use of my kidneys. Does this lead to the further conclusion that it is
permissible for me to unplug myself from him? I think not.
To begin with I do not find the demand that I remain plugged in
to the violinist "outrageous," as Thomson does. That the Society of
Music Lovers should kidnap me and plug me in to him without my
consent is outrageous; 11 but we may modify the analogy to eliminate
that element from it. Suppose, instead of kidnapping me, the Society
of Music Lovers or the violinist himself beseech me for aid, explaining
that I alone can save him from death. Logically, I have a choice I can
aid him, and save his life, or refuse, and guarantee his death. I am in
this sense free to choose; my automony is not being infringed. Morally,
however, it seems to me that I have no choice; it is "morally incumbent"
on me to aid the violinist, if for no other reason than that the moral
value of his life outweighs the inconvenience to me of saving it. In
other words, refusing to aid the violinist seems to me to be morally
wrong, impermissible, whatever my rights· in the matter might be. 12
So far we have only a conflict of intuitions; but it turns out that
Thomson's intuitions about a similar case provide the basis for an advance in the argument. She writes:
We must surely all grant that there may be cases in which it would
be morally indecent to detach a person from your body at the cost
of his life. Suppose you learn that what the violinist needs is not
nine years 13 of your life, but only one hour; all you need do to save
his life is to spend one hour in bed with him. Suppose also that letting
him use your kidneys for that hour would not affect your health in
the slightest. Admittedly you were kidnapped. Admittedly you did
not give anyone permission to plug him into you. Nevertheless it
seems to me plain you ought to allow him to use your kidneys for
that hour-it would be indecent to refuse. 1•

Thus, Thomson's intuitions about what one is obligated to do in this
situation square with mine about what one is obligated to do in tbe
situation where one must remain plugged in to the violinist for nine
months. Yet the situation with respect to the rights of the violinist is,
by her own account, the same in both cases! Even if your aid would re-
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quire only an hour of your time, she argues, the violinist has no right
to the use of your kidneys, no right to demand what you are obligated
to provide. 15 It seems clear from this that the allocation of rights to the
parties involved is not sufficient to determine the moral permissibility of
refusing aid; in fact, the question of rights turns out to be a red herring.
II
What is it, then, that makes a demand that in Thomson's eyes is
outrageous in one case but perfectly acceptable in another? The relevant difference between the two cases is surely the amount of time and
inconvenience to the aid-giver involved, not the rights of the recipient.
But how much inconvenience must there be for the moral obligation
to give aid to be eliminated? Here is Thomson's answer:
Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right to demand
it ... nobody is morally required to make large sacrafices of
health, of all other interests and concerns, of all other duties and
commitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in order to
keep another person alive. ' 6

Such a principle may fit well with ethical egoism, with the ethical
beliefs of the "me-generation," or with old-fashioned rugged individualism
but is it correct? It is interesting that in the context Thomson introduces
a discussion of the parable of the Good Samaritan, the parable on
which I shall focus for the remainder of the paper. It is clear that
Thomson thinks of Good Sarnaritanism as supererogatory from a moral
standpoint; morally virtuous, certainly, but not obligatory, and certainly
not the moral standard one should require by law. 17 Writing about
parents who face an unplanned pregnancy, she states:
if they had taken all reasonable precautions against having a child,
they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the
child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it.
They may wish to assume responsibility for it, or they may not wish
to. And I am suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would
require large sacrafices, then they may refuse. A Good Samaritan
would not refuse-or anyway, a Splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifice
that had to be made were enormous. But then so would a Good
Samaritan assume responsibility for that violinist."

It is clear that Thomson regards a Good Samaritan as one who accepts
sacrifices in order to aid others which are greater than those he is
morally required to accept; it is also clear that she thinks that such a
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person would accept the task of keeping the violinist, or an unborn
baby, alive. "We have in fact to distinguish between two kinds of
Samaritan," she writes, "the Good Samaritan and what we might call
the Minimally Decent Samaritan." 19 The former, presumably, would
accept large sacrifices to aid others, and would aid the violinist even if
that involved being plugged into him for nine months; the latter,
though falling short of this high standard, would help out the violinist
if it took only an hour and required no risk to his health. Both are to
be distinguished, she thinks, from people like the Levite and the priest
of the parable, who fail to be even minimally decent.
Thomson's understandin g of the Good Samaritan parable is at
odds with its proper interpretatio n. This is a matter of importance, for
only if Thomson's perspective on the story is accepted, rather than the
Christian perspective, can abortion be justified. The parable, you will
recall, is told by Jesus in response to a lawyer's question. The lawyer
had asked what he must do to inherit eternal life, and Jesus had
responded by asking him what the law said. The man had replied:
You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all
your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and
your neighbor as yourself. (Luke 10.27; all Biblical quotations are
from the Revised Standard Version.)

When Jesus had expressed approval of this answer, the lawyer then
asked the question that elicited the parable: "And who is my neighbor?"
(10.29)
The purpose of the parable, then, is to explain part of the meaning
of the commandme nt, ''you shall love year neighbor as yourself''; it is
designed to show that one's neighbor cannot be limited to one's countrymen or coreligionists, that anyone may be a neighbor by behaving as
one. It is also designed, not incidentally, to show by example how the
commandme nt might be fulfilled. It is clear, however, that "you shall
love your neighbor as yourself" is put forth as a commandme nt, as a
statement of the (religious) law, as something one is obligated to obey,
and not, as Thomson would have it, of something that is virtuous but
supererogato ry. (Cf. Mark 12-29-31, where Jesus gives the answer
given in this passage by the lawyer in answer to the question, "Which
commandme nt is the first of all?") It follows from this that, at least
from the standpoint of Christian ehtics, love of one's neighbor and
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the Good Samaritanism entailed by it are moral imperatives, and that
Thomson is wrong when she says that ''nobody is morally required to
make large sacrifices ... to keep another person alive. " 20 This also
shows why Jesus does not find it necessary, as does Thomson, to distinguish Good from Minimally Decent Samaritans: he is interested in
enjoining on his followers the higher standard, rather than the lower.
Christian ethics, then, in making Good Samaritanism a moral
obligation, requires the large sacrifices Thomson thinks are not morally
required in the interest of another's life. Still, it would seem possible
to argue about degrees. Exactly how large a sacrifice is one required to
make on behalf of one's neighbor? The parable does not answer this
question by itself. John Kleinig, noting that "the Good Samaritan of
the parable does not fight the robbers and risk his welfare, " 2 1 asserts
that "a potential Good Samaritan could not be morally required to
risk (and probably lose) his life in order to save that of another. " 22
This seems to be counsel of prudence, but the Bible is less compromising.
The commandment that generates the parable requires that we love
our neighbors as ourselves, which implies that we should make the
same sacrifices for them that we would in our own interest. Jesus, in
another passage, presents a commandment that seems to be a variation
on the one recited by the lawyer, and expounds its meaning as follows:
This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved
you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life
for his friends . (John 15.12-13)

And, apropos of the question of eternal life, which after all was the
motivation for the lawyer's initial question, Jesus states, "Whoever
would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for may sake
and gospel's will save it" (Mark 8.35). 23
Even devout Christians would probably admit that such a degree
of self-sacrifice is beyond normal human power; and even the Good
Samaritan does not go so far. What he does (and what the Levite and
the priest fail to do) is show compassion and mercy on the man who
has been beaten by robbers:
[He] went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and
wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn,
and took care of him . And the next day he took out two denarii and
gave them to the innkeeper, saying "Take care of him; and whatever
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more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.' (Luke 10.34-35)

How does this conduct bear on the issue of abortion? As we have
already noted, Thomson admits that a Good Samaritan would take responsibility for the violinist in her example, and would not unplug
himself, even if he had to remain plugged in for nine months. Likewise, we may assume, a pregnant Good Samaritan would not unplug
herself from her fetus, even if she had to remain in bed for the duration of her pregnancy, sacrificing all other interests and obligations,
and risking her health in the bargain. What Thomson has failed to
realize is that the Good Samaritan who behaved in such a compassionate manner would, had he or she been a Christian, have regarded
such compassion as a moral requirement, and refusal to provide the
necessary assistance to the violinist or the fetus as morally impermissible.
The analogy between the Good Samaritan parable and the case
of pregnancy is not particularly close. The Samaritan and the man he
aided were strangers, and in fact members of rival nations; whereas
the pregnant woman, whatever her attitude toward the fetus may be,
stands to it in the biological relation of parent to child. In the parable,
others could have aided the beaten man, but in the case of pregnancy,
at least in its earlier stages, only the pregnant woman can provide the
means necessary to secure the life of the fetus. 2 • The Good Samaritan
gave active assistance to the victim of the robbers, without which he
probably would have died; but the pregnant woman need only refrain
from obtaining an abortion for the fetus (in the normal course of
events) to survive. 25 Moreover, should the pregnant woman decide to
obtain an abortion, she would be doing more than simply refusing to
give aid to the fetus, as the Levite and priest of the parable refuse to
aid the man by the roadside; she would be authorizing others, on her
behalf, to undertake a direct attack on the body and life of the fetus 26
(in terms of the parable, this would seem to be closer to hiring the robbers to carry out the assault than to a refusal to aid the victim). 21
All of the factors cited not only create disanalogies between the
relation of a pregnant woman to her fetus and the relation of the
Good Samaritan to the victim of the robbers; they also strengthen the
case for the claim that the woman has an obligation to carry her fetus
to term . The analogy is close in two crucial respects, however. The
fetus, like the victim, is in need of the assistance of the pregnant
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woman; without her passive compliance, if not her active cooperation,
it faces a death that is more certain than that of the beaten man on the
roadside. Moreover, the consequences of passive compliance in her
pregnancy on the part of the woman are quite similar to those of the
Samaritan's active assistance to the robber's victim . It is these
similarities that make the analogy a good one; and the analogy serves
to remind us that, even if all of the factors mentioned above were absent, the woman would still, from a Christian perspective, have a
moral obligation to refrain from aborting her child.

Pace Thomson, the fact that a pregnant woman stands in a relation
to her fetus analogous to that of the Good Samaritan to the roadside
victim demonstrates the moral impermissibility, the "indecency," of
most abortions. The demonstration (which adrriittedly will only be
persuasive to those who accept the moral requirements underlying the
parable of the Good Samaritan) does not rely on the allocation of
rights to the fetus; it relies on the need, and on the helplessness, of the
fetus and on the moral obligation to be compassionate.
When we have reached this conclusion, however, we have not
exhausted the relevance of the parable to the abortion question. It is a
frequent complaint of women who favor abortion that those who oppose
it in the interest of the fetus's "right to life" care nothing for the
rights of the woman carrying the fetus. She is allowed to drop out of
the picture, to become invisible; the only interest she holds for the
anti-abortionist is as a receptacle for his cherished fetus. This complaint,
though overstated, is sometimes justified; but a lack of concern for
the pregnant woman is as intolerable, from the standpoint of the
parable, as a lack of concern for the fetus.
We may not forget, in other words, that the woman seeking an
abortion also stands in a state of need. She may be, as Thomson states,
a "sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant
due to rape, " 28 or a woman ... utterly devastated by the thought of a
child, a bit of herself, put out for adoption and never seen or heard
again. " 29 If we are to deny such women the remedy of abortion, we
must certainly be prepared to provide an alternative to that remedy.
Let us then put the pregnant woman in the position of the beaten man
(a particularly apt position, if she has become pregnant due to rape)
and ask what we, as potential Good Samaritans, might do to help.
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First, we have an obligation to express our compassion and
sympathy. This is manifestly not enough in itself; if the Good
Samaritan had merely told the victim how sorry he was that he had
been injured, the parable would have been forgotten long ago. Talk is
notoriously cheap; but such a gesture would be at least a beginning .
The Good Samaritan offered more than soothing words; he
offered action, which speaks louder. I have only a few suggestions,
which I recognize to be incomplete and inadequate, for what might be
done in this area. Like the Samaritan in the parable, we could offer
medical assistance, transportation, food and shelter to pregnant
women in need of them. We could attempt to alleviate their fears by
providing accurate information about childbirth and adoption, and by
working to make both processes more humane and responsive to the
needs of pregnant women. We could deal with some of the trauma of
pregnancy due to rape by psychological counselling for the victim and
vigorous prosecution of the assailant.
One of the most appropriate acts for potential Good Samaritans
would be to adopt children of women who are unable to rear them
themselves. The obligation to rear a child is at least logically
distinguishable from the obligation to bear one, yet many women seek
abortions because they do not believe that they could adequately carry
out the former task rather than the latter. In behalf of the women who
are able to care for the children they bear, and who find even more
humane adoption procedures unacceptable, we ought to work to remove
the remaining social stigma (which is admittedly much less than it was
a generation, or even a decade ago) which attaches to the unwed
mother, the single parent, and the child born out of wedlock. If we
truly believe in the sanctity of life and the positive value of
motherhood, we will refuse to tolerate the social ostracism and condemnation of those lives which do not benefit from traditional family
structures. I have likened the pregnant woman who carries her child to
term to the Good Samaritan; I might also point out that the Bible's
most exalted image of womanhood comes in the person of a woman
whose pregnancy was initiated before her marriage to a man who was
not the biological father of her child.
In conclusion, I have tried to show in this paper that the central
issue in the abortion controversy is not that of the rights of the parties
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involved, but that of the place of Good Samaritanism in the morality
of our society. The true underpinning of Thomson's defense of abortion
is an ethical view in terms of which no one is obligated to do very
much to help his neighbor-a view which generates a society in which
individuals are not typically expected to love and cherish one another.
It is this view and its resulting society that are at odds with the ideals
of Christianity; and it is for this reason and not for reasons that concern the rights of the fetus to life, that Christians must find abortion
morally impermissible.
The University of Colorado, Boulder

NOTES

'This point has been made by Philip J . Rossi, S.J., in "'Rights' are Not Enough:
Prospects for a New Approach to the Morality of Abortion." Linacre Quarterly 46
(1979), p. 109. The approach I take to the abortion issue was in part inspired by this
article and by my discussions of the issue with Phil, to whom I owe much.
' ''A Defense of Abortion,'' Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971); reprinted in
The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.
3-22. All page references are to the reprint edition .
'Stanely Hauerwas has argued in A Community of Character (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 212-229, that Christians have made a
mistake trying to formulate their opposition to abortion in terms of the language of
rights, since that language does not adequately capture the essence of the Christian
ethical position. Hauerwas is, in my view, completely correct on this point.
Of course, other, less demanding, ethical frameworks than Christianity might be assumed;
I offer no argument for the superiority of the Christian perspective. I do believe, though
I cannot argue the point in this paper, that Thomson's justification of abortion is in fact
incompatible with most major ethical and social theories, excluding only libertarianism
(for which the question of rights is the be-all and end-all of moral argument) and
egotism. If this is so, such theories as Aristotle's, Kant's, and even Mill's would concur
with the Christian perspective on abortion.
'Op.cit.,p.4. that the fetus is a human life-form, a living human organism, and
that human life-forms are among the things which are entitled to our serious moral concern, are two assumptions l make (and not merely for the sake of argument) but do not
defend here. Both require (and, l think, can be given) defense; and many proponents of
abortion will choose to attack one or both of them, rather than to follow Thomson's
strategy.
' Ibid., pp. 4-5 .
'Ibid., p. 11.
' Ibid., p. 13.
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
0
' 1 find several aspects of the analogy misleading . The violinist in the analogy is
not related in any way to the reader, whereas the fetus stands in the closest biological
and social relationship to the pregnant woman, that of child to parent; and the obliga-
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tion of parents to children is more stringent than that of perfect strangers to one
another. The analogy also requires far more confinement of the reader than is required
of the pregnant woman in a normal pregnancy and the fact that the reader has been kidnapped makes the analogy close only to those pregnancies which are due to rape.
''Thomson assumes (cf. p. 21) that the way in which rights, responsibilities, and
obligations arise is through the granting or assuming of them by the parties involved: in
other words, by choice. Thus, the fact that one party in the case was kidnapped would
seem to absolve him from all responsibility to the other. She has been criticized for this
assumption (e.g., by John Finnis, in "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973) reprinted in The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, p. 91.) I should like to add that one often finds oneself in situations, not of one's
own making, where responsibilities simply must be assumed. If I am a soldier in combat, my obligation to assist my fellow soldiers is not eliminated or diminished by the
fact that I was drafted. It is in general morally incumbent on me to act as the situation
requires, regardless of how the situation arose. Thus, though I find the fact that I am to
imagine myself to have been kidnapped in Thomson's scenario outrageous, I do not
believe that it bears on the issue of my responsibility to the violinist. Thomson's own
remarks about a similar situation (cf. p. 4 below) support this conclusion.
"l assume that I have no other responsibilities which override my responsibility
to aid the violinist. If my aid were required to save several lives (say to fight a fire in
which a number of people were certain to die without my assistance), my duty would lie
there, and not with the violinist. Further, if aiding the violinist were to prevent me from
performing my job or meeting my responsibilities to my family for the period required,
I might justly require compensation from the violinist or the Society of Music Lovers.
"On p. 6 of her article, Thomson points out that opponents of abortion would
not find abortion permissible if pregnancy lasted nine years rather than nine months, or
even the rest of the mother's life. Thereafter, she sometimes (as in this passage) refers to
the longer period.
Her point is not as fanciful as it may seem; for though the obligation to bear a child ends
with the child's birth, the subsequent obligation to rear the child may continue until the
child is an adult; or, in the case of a handicapped child, it may become a lifelong obligation.
"Thomson, pp. 15-16.
"Ibid., pp. 16-17. The reader will note that, as I use the terms "ought" and
"obligation," one has an obligation to do something if and only if one ought to do it. I
believe this usage squares with Thomson's.
"Ibid., pp. 17-18.
''I should note that I am concerned in this paper only with the question of the
moral permissibility of abortion, and not with the question of what the law should be.
"Thomson, p. 21.
"Ibid., p. 18.
"Ibid., pp. 17-18.
""Good Samaritans," Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1976), p. 385.
"Ibid.
"It may seem that by drawing the consequence of the necessity for the supreme
sacrifice on behalf of one's neighbor (or, as the passage from John has it, one's friends)
I am ignoring a traditional distinction between what we are commanded to do and what
we are merely counselled to do. Though this distinction is justified by its proponents on
the basis of such passages as Matthew I 9 .16-22, I do not believe it is apposite to the
abortion question. In general, I do not find the command/counsel distinction a valuable
one for Christian ethics. It seems to me that Christians are commanded to do things
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which are beyond human power ("ought" in Christian ethics does not imply "can " ),
and must rely for their response on faith (cf. Luke I 8.27) and repentance.
" Medical technology keeps pushing viability earlier and earlier in fetal development;
today some fetusses can survive outside the womb at only six months from conception;
most delivered at seven months or later live. Should artificial wombs be developed in
which even younger fetusses could survive with a high degree of probability, or should it
become possible to transplant a fetus into the womb of another woman (a development
many sterile women would rejoice at), the responsibility of the natural mother to the
fetus would, I think, be greatly diminished.
" If the pregnant woman assumes the role of the Good Samaritan she will, of
course care for more than the mere survival of the fetus she will wish it to be born in a
healthy condition . This will require more than her passive compliance; she will have to
refrain from certain activities (e.g. , heavy drinking) and follow certain prescriptions
concerning diet, exercise, etc., to ensure the child's health.
" Cf. Finnis, p. 109.
" Her culpability is not as great as this comparison would suggest, but only
because debate about the humanity of the fetus would make it impossible to establish
beyond doubt that the woman seeking an abortion was aware that she was attacking a
human being .
" Thomson, p. 21.
" Ibid., p. 22.
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